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Children’s understanding of ambiguous figures: Which cognitive developments are necessary to 
experience reversal? 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In two experiments involving 138 3- to- 5-year-olds we examined the claim that a complex 
understanding of ambiguity is required to experience reversal of ambiguous stimuli (Gopnik 
& Rosati, 2001).  In Experiment 1 a novel Production task measured the ability to 
acknowledge both interpretations of ambiguous figures.  This was as easy as and significantly 
correlated with a False Belief task, and easier than a Droodle task.  We replicated this finding 
in Experiment 2, and also found that perceiving reversal of ambiguous figures was harder than 
either the False Belief or Production tasks.  In contrast to previous findings, the Reversal and 
Droodle tasks were not specifically related.  We conclude that children only attempt reversal 
once they can understand the representational relationship between the figure and its two 
interpretations.  The process resulting in reversal however is hard, probably requiring 
additional developments in executive functioning and imagery abilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates at what age children are able to reverse ambiguous figures, and what 
conceptual abilities are necessary for this ability.  Ambiguous figures are pictures which have 
two different interpretations such as the duck-rabbit (Jastrow, 1900), man-mouse (Bugelski & 
Alampay, 1961), and vase-faces (Rubin, 2000) (see Figure 1).  When informed adults view 
these figures they tend to experience them reversing from one interpretation to the other.  
Research by Rock and colleagues suggests that for this to happen, adults must know that the 
figure is ambiguous and what the interpretations are (Girgus, Rock, & Egatz, 1977; Rock & 
Mitchener, 1992; Rock, Hall, & Davis, 1994).  This implies that reversal is a top-down active 
process.  Perceivers must have a conceptual framework capable of representing that figures 
can have more than one interpretation, and the abilities necessary to bring about reversal.   
However, some adults do experience reversals without being informed of the 
ambiguity.  This might be because they have prior experience with ambiguous figures.  
Because young children are unlikely to have had such experience, Rock, Gopnik, & Hall 
(1994; Gopnik & Rosati, 2001) examined spontaneous reversal in preschoolers.  When 
uninformed of the ambiguity, and told to look at a figure for 60 seconds, no child ever 
reported reversal. These findings support the idea that in order to achieve reversal of an 
ambiguous figure, the viewer must be aware of the ambiguity.   
There was also a developmental effect: even after the ambiguity had been clearly 
demonstrated to them, informed younger children were particularly unlikely to reverse.  This 
suggests that either the necessary conceptual framework or the ability to bring about reversal 
arises during the preschool period.  The aim of this paper is to examine these possibilities. 
Gopnik & Rosati (2001) repeated the reversal procedure, adding a false belief task 
(Experiment 1) and a ‘Droodle’ task (Experiment 2).  The False Belief task tests for children’s 
understanding of other people’s beliefs, which contrast with the child’s.  It is generally 
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accepted that success on the False Belief task demonstrates that children are able to represent 
the relationship between beliefs and the state of the world the beliefs are about.  
Understanding that an ambiguous figure can represent two distinct objects also requires 
children to be able to represent the representational relationship between the figure and the 
two interpretations.  One therefore might expect an association between the two tasks.  
Gopnik & Rosati (Expt. 1) found no correlation between the tasks, and the Reversal task was 
considerably harder than the False Belief task. 
The Droodle task requires children to report that a person only seeing a small 
unidentifiable portion of a stimulus will not know what it is (Taylor, 1988; Perner & Davies, 
1991).  It can therefore be seen as assessing understanding of the effect that an ambiguous 
stimulus has on the mental state of a viewer.  In the Droodle task, children are shown a small 
unidentifiable portion of a picture, then shown the full picture.  They are then asked whether 
another person who only saw the small portion would know what the full picture was (Taylor, 
1988; Perner & Davies, 1991).  The stimulus is ambiguous in the sense that it could plausibly 
be part of more than one picture.  The task assesses children’s understanding of the effect of 
this ambiguity on the mental state of the viewer.  Typically children up until the age of five 
years wrongly judge that a viewer would know what the full picture was.  Gopnik & Rosati 
found that performance on the Droodle task correlated very well with performance on the 
Reversal task (φ = 0.86, p < 0.0001) and performances hardly differed.  Their tentative 
conclusion was that reversal requires an abstract and complex understanding of ambiguity.  
They did not provide any more detailed explanation of what this understanding of ambiguity 
might entail. 
If correct, this finding would indicate that the critical development is in the conceptual 
prerequisites of reversal, rather than the ability to bring it about.  It would also indicate what 
the conceptual prerequisites are: whatever gives rise to success on the Droodle task.  
However, this finding is surprising for several reasons.  Both the Reversal and Droodle tasks 
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require children to understand that a stimulus can have two interpretations, and is therefore 
ambiguous. However, each has additional requirements that the other does not.  The Droodle 
task also requires children to understand the effect of this ambiguity on the knowledge state of 
another person; the Reversal task does not.  The Reversal task requires children to perform 
some kind of mental action; the Droodle task does not.  Neither additional requirement seems 
trivial, so a strong association between the tasks would not be expected. 
Because Gopnik & Rosati’s findings were surprising, unexpected, and came from a 
small sample of only 28 participants, in pilot work for the present paper we compared 
performance on the Reversal, False Belief & Droodle tasks in a sample of 62 3- to 5-year-olds 
(the methods of all 3 tasks were as used in the experiments reported below).  We found that 
the Reversal and Droodle tasks were of similar difficulty, but were only very weakly related (r 
= .26, p < .05).  The finding of a relatively weak relationship between the two tasks is 
consistent with our task analysis. 
It therefore remains plausible that the conceptual prerequisites of reversal arise earlier 
than success on the Reversal or Droodle tasks.  If reversal is a top-down process, children 
must first be able to understand that one figure can have two interpretations.  This poses a 
representational puzzle similar to that posed by homonymy.  Homonyms are words with two 
unrelated meanings, such as bat (sports equipment) and bat (flying animal).  Both ambiguous 
figures and homonyms are tokens in a representational medium – pictorial or linguistic – 
which can represent different things depending on context.  Understanding this requires 
children to represent the relationship between the representational medium and the situation 
referred to.  False belief and synonymy also require children to do this: synonymy, because 
one situation can be referred to by two different words, and false belief because one situation 
can be represented by different beliefs (some of which may be false).   
Children pass tasks assessing their understanding of homonymy, synonymy and false 
belief at roughly the age of four years, and performances on these tasks have been found to be 
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consistently intercorrelated (Doherty & Perner, 1998; Doherty, 2000; Perner, Stummer, 
Sprung & Doherty, 2002).  We would therefore expect children to pass a task requiring them 
to acknowledge the two interpretations of an ambiguous figure at the same age, and for their 
performance to correlate with performances on any of these other tasks. 
Experiment 1 investigates whether children are able to acknowledge both 
interpretations of ambiguous stimuli at a younger age than they have been found to reverse.  
In order to do this we adapted the “say something different” (SSD) task, previously used to 
assess understanding of synonymy (e.g. Doherty & Perner, 1998; Perner et al., 2002) for use 
with ambiguous figures.  Early ability to acknowledge both interpretations, and a continued 
lack of association between the Reversal and Droodle tasks would support the idea that the 
basic conceptual development involved is the ability to understand that one stimulus can have 
two interpretations.  Possible additional cognitive developments, such as developments in 
executive function and imagery might also be involved; we consider these in the General 
Discussion.   
In our novel SSD task the experimenter showed children an ambiguous figure and provided 
one interpretation, e.g. “rabbit”.  The child’s task was to name the alternative interpretation 
(“duck”).  After some intervening trials, the experimenter showed the same figure, this time 
providing the other interpretation, e.g. “duck”.  Again the child had to name the alternative 
interpretation (“rabbit”).  Children were scored as successful on that item if they could supply the 
alternative interpretation on both occasions.  This criterion was necessary since children would be 
successful half the time by providing their favored interpretation regardless of what the experimenter 
said. 
Children’s understanding of ambiguous figure  7 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy three children (39 girls) from five preschools in Stirling, Scotland took part.  Three 
additional children did not complete the experiment.  Children comprised four groups as 
follows: 
3-year-olds:   18 children from 2;10 to 3;6, mean age 3;3, SD = 2.5 months. 
3½-year-olds:  19 children from 3;7 to 4;1, mean age 3;10, SD = 2 months. 
4-year-olds:  19 children from 4;3 to 4;10, mean age 4;7, SD = 2.5 months. 
5-year-olds:  17 children from 4;11 to 5;6, mean age 5;2, SD = 2.5 months. 
Design 
Each child received all four tasks: the Production ambiguous figure task, the False Belief and 
Droodle tasks, and an additional ambiguous figure task we will not discuss here.  Testing 
comprised two sessions, one with the False Belief and Production tasks and one with the 
Droodle and the other ambiguous figure tasks.  Order of the two sessions and of the two tasks 
within each session was counterbalanced 
Materials 
Production task 
The ambiguous figures were three line drawings depicting a duck/rabbit, a vase/faces and a 
man/mouse (see Figure 1).  Each was drawn in pencil on A4 (29.5 x 21 cm) paper.  For each 
ambiguous figure there were two disambiguating context drawings.  For example, for the 
duck/rabbit the two drawings were of a duck’s body on a lake with other ducks in the 
background, and a rabbit’s body, complete with a carrot.  These were also on A4 sheets with 
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holes cut to accommodate the ambiguous stimulus, in this case the duck’s/rabbit’s head.  The 
other disambiguating context drawings are also shown in Figure 1. 
Droodle 
The Droodle task involved two A4 pencil drawings of a birthday cake and of a giraffe. A 
second piece of paper with a 3 cm square hole could be laid over these drawings.  With only 
this small portion of the drawing visible it was impossible to tell what was depicted.  A hand 
puppet served as research assistant. 
False Belief 
The False Belief task involved two Playpeople dolls (5 cm), a marble, an opaque jar (5 cm 
high x 2.5 cm wide) and a box (3 cm high x 4 cm wide). 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a quiet part of the classroom.  Each session took 
approximately ten minutes. 
Ambiguous figures disambiguation phase 
This phase took place before the Production task.  The child was presented with one of the 
ambiguous stimuli, for example the duck/rabbit.  The experimenter said: “I have a funny 
picture for you, shall we have a look?  Now this is a picture which can be two different things.  
What do you think this is? [Child answers, e.g. rabbit.] Yes, you are right, it’s a rabbit.”   The 
experimenter then put the rabbit’s body onto the stimulus to disambiguate it, reinforcing the 
child’s interpretation.  The child was asked to point out the rabbit’s ears.  Then the 
experimenter said “But look it can be something else too. [puts on the body of the duck.]  
What is it now?  … Yes you are right, it’s a duck!”  Again the child was asked to point out the 
duck’s mouth to ensure that s/he was genuinely perceiving this alternative.  The experimenter 
finally reminded the child of the two alternatives: “Now this is very funny. This picture can 
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change back and forth from a rabbit [briefly adds the rabbit’s body] to a duck [briefly adds the 
duck’s body]” and then with appropriate swapping of the disambiguating context drawings 
and brief pauses to allow the child to look at the figure, “or from a duck to a rabbit. But it 
might just stay a rabbit or it might just stay a duck”.   
 Children usually referred to the vase as a cup.  The experimenter subsequently referred 
to it in the same way.  
Production task 
The experimenter first told the child “Remember, all these pictures can be two different 
things. Now I am going to say one thing and I want you to say the other thing, ok?”.  She then 
showed the child the first picture, the duck/rabbit, without either of the disambiguating 
context drawings and said, “This is a rabbit.  What else can it be?” 
If the child repeated the experimenter, she said “But I’ve already said that it’s a rabbit.  
What else can it be?”.  If the child did not provide the correct answer after a reasonable pause, 
the experimenter said, “I know! It can be a duck, can’t it?”. 
This procedure was repeated with the vase/faces and man/mouse figures, with the 
experimenter identifying them as glass and man.  Then each trial was repeated in the same 
order, with the experimenter identifying the objects with the other interpretation: duck, faces, 
mouse.  Children were scored correct on an ambiguous figure if they were able to supply the 
opposite interpretation on both trials.  Thus children were able to score from 0 to 3. 
False Belief task 
For this test a short story was acted out with the two dolls, marble, jar and box.  In the story 
Sally, places a marble in the box and exits.  In her absence Tony moves the marble to the jar 
and also leaves.  Sally returns and children are asked the following questions: 
Belief Question:  Where will she look first for her marble? 
Reality Question:  Where is the marble really? 
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Memory Question:  Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning? 
Droodle task 
Self experience question 
One of the drawings was selected and the piece of paper with a 3 cm square hole laid over it 
so that only a small unidentifiable portion of the drawing was visible.  Children were shown 
this and asked what the drawing was.  Whether or not they had a guess, the experimenter said 
“Shall we have a look what it is?” and removed the cover to reveal the object.  The cover was 
then replaced.  The experimenter brought a puppet out of her bag and said “Puppet has never 
seen this picture before. If he comes in and sees just this bit, does he know that this is a 
giraffe/birthday cake?”. 
Full information control question 
This was similar to the self experience test, except that the drawing was fully visible from the 
start.  Children were asked what it was, and then without concealing the drawing, Puppet was 
brought out and the experimenter said “Puppet has never seen this picture before. If he comes 
in and sees this, does he know that this is a birthday cake/giraffe?”.   
To pass the Droodle task, children had to answer “no” to the self experience question 
and “yes” to the full information control question.  The self experience task was always 
presented first, and which picture was used for which task was counterbalanced between 
children. 
Results 
False Belief task 
Children’s performance on the False Belief question was typical of this age range, with a 
majority of 3-year-olds failing and a majority of older children passing (see Table 1).  This 
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improvement is significant: Kruskall-Wallis χ2 = 19.3, df = 3, p < 0.001.  The only significant 
difference between adjacent age groups’ performances is between those of 3½-year-olds and 
4-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact, p = 0.038. 
Droodle task 
Children’s performance on the Droodle Task was also typical: most 3- and 4-year-olds failed; 
a majority of 5-year-olds passed.  This improvement is also significant, Kruskall-Wallis χ2 = 
19.8, df = 3, p < 0.001.  The only significant difference between adjacent age groups’ 
performances is between those of 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact, p = 0.007. 
Production 
Table 2 shows children’s performance in the Production Task.  Most of the 3-year-olds 
managed to produce no pairs of interpretations or only 1, whereas most 4-year-olds produced 
all three pairs.  This age improvement is significant, F (3, 69) = 13.2, p < 0.001.  Contrast 
analysis shows that the only significant difference between adjacent groups’ performances is 
between those of the 3½-year-olds and the 4-year-olds, t (69) = 3.07, p = 0.003.  In most cases 
when children failed to produce a pair they produced one single item.  There were 6 cases 
where neither rabbit nor duck was produced, 6 cases where neither cup nor faces was 
produced, and 4 cases where neither man nor mouse was produced.  Only one child failed to 
produce either interpretation on all three trials. 
Comparison of tasks 
Table 3a shows intercorrelations between age and performance on the Production, False 
Belief, and Droodle tasks1.  Table 3b shows intercorrelations between these tasks when age is 
partialled out.  Performances on all tasks are strongly related to age.  Although all tasks are 
correlated, only the correlation between performances on the Production and False Belief 
tasks remain significant when age is partialled out. 
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In order to compare all tasks, children were scored as passing the Production task if 
they produced at least 2 out of 3 pairs of interpretations.  This strikes a balance between 
excessively strict (3 out of 3 trials correct) which would punish minor lapses in attention, and 
excessively lenient (1 out of 3 trials correct) which might allow some success through random 
factors.  The Droodle task is harder than the False Belief and Production tasks (McNemar, 
binomial, both ps < 0.001), which are of equal difficulty.   
Discussion 
The Production task assesses the ability to acknowledge that there are two interpretations of 
an ambiguous figure.  The results show that this ability develops rapidly around the age of 4-
years and is linked to the ability to understand belief.   It is considerably easier than the ability 
to pass the Droodle task.  This is consistent with the hypothesis, introduced above, that 
children are able to conceive of a stimulus as having more than one interpretation from the 
age of roughly four, and this understanding has a common basis with understanding of belief.  
It is this understanding, we suggest, that allows children to attempt reversal.  In the following 
experiment we compare performance on the Production task with performance on the 
Reversal task. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Participants 
Sixty-five children (36 girls) from a working class and middle class primary school in 
Stirling, Scotland took part.  Children comprised three groups as follows: 
3-year-olds: 21 children from 3;4 to 4;4, mean age 3;10, SD = 4 months. 
4-year-olds: 23 children from 4;5 to 4;11, mean age 4;8, SD = 2 months. 
5-year-olds: 21 children from 5;0 to 5;9, mean age 5;4, SD = 2.5 months. 
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Design 
Each child was tested on four tasks: False belief, Droodle, Production and the Reversal task.  
Half the children had a Disambiguation phase based on Rock, Gopnik, & Hall’s original task, 
and half had the version used in Experiment 1.  Children either received the Production task 
first and the Reversal task last or vice versa.  The False Belief and Droodle tasks were 
administered second and third, counterbalanced. 
Procedure 
Reversal task 
Disambiguation phase 
Version 1 of the Reversal task included the Disambiguation phase used in Experiment 1.  
Version 2 had the disambiguation phase used by Rock et al. (1994).   The figures were 
disambiguated by analogy, showing a disambiguated picture of each interpretation, rather than 
by adding appropriate surrounding context.  Otherwise the two versions were identical. 
 
Test Phase 
The experimenter said “Now I want you to look at this picture. Remember it might change or 
it might not. You tell me if it changes or not, and see if you can keep looking at the picture”. 
As well as asking children to report any changes in interpretation, the experimenter also 
asked, “what do you see”, after 5, 30 and 60 seconds. Children who reported a change in 
interpretation of the ambiguous figure at any point in the 60 second period were coded as 
reversers; children who did not report any change were coded as non-reversers. 
Production task 
The stimulus set in the Production task was altered to prevent carry-over effects between it 
and the Reversal task.  Whichever of the three stimuli was used in the Reversal task was 
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replaced with the Eskimo-Indian ambiguous figure (Ernst, 1986; see Figure 1d).  Otherwise 
the counterbalancing was as before. 
Results 
False Belief and Droodle tasks 
Performances on the False Belief and Droodle tasks were again typical (see Table 4).  Most 3-
year-olds failed the False Belief task and most older children passed.  This improvement is 
significant: Kruskall-Wallis χ2= 11.6, p = 0.003.  Differences between adjacent groups’ 
performances were only marginally significant  (Fisher’s exact, ps < 0.07).  Most 5-year-olds 
passed the Droodle task and most younger children failed.  This improvement is significant: 
Kruskall-Wallis χ2= 13.1, p = 0.001.  The only significant difference between adjacent 
groups’ performances is between those of 3- and 4-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact p = 0.007 
Production 
As before, most 3-year-olds produced no pairs of interpretations or only one, and most older 
children produced at least two pairs.  This age improvement is significant, F (2, 62) = 9.84, p 
< 0.001.  Contrast analysis shows significant differences between both the 3- and 4-year-olds’ 
and the 4- and 5-year-olds’ performances (t(62) = 2.47, p = 0.016 and t (6) = 2.06, p = 0.044, 
respectively).  
Reversal tasks 
Performance on the two versions of the reversal task could not have been closer: 34% of 
children reversed on Version 1 and 33% reversed on Version 2.  The two tasks were 
combined into a single reversal measure.  Most 3- and 4-year-olds did not report reversal, 
whereas most 5-year-olds did.  This age improvement is significant, Kruskall-Wallis χ2= 7.64, 
p = 0.022.  The only significant difference between adjacent groups’ performances is between 
those of 4- and 5-year-olds, Fisher’s Exact p = 0.037. 
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Comparison of tasks  
Table 5a shows intercorrelations between age and performance on the four tasks; Table 5b 
shows intercorrelations when age is partialled out.  Performances on all tasks are positively 
correlated with age.  Most other tasks are intercorrelated; the strongest correlations are 
between performance on the Production task and performances on both the False Belief and 
Droodle tasks, r = 0.43 and r = 0.44, respectively, ps < 0.001.  These correlations remain 
significant after age is partialled out, although the correlation between performances on the 
False Belief and Production tasks is only marginally significant, p = 0.056.  Performances on 
the Droodle and Reversal tasks were only modestly correlated, r = .31, p < 0.05, and this 
correlation did not remain significant after age had been partialled out, r = 0.18.   
 As in Experiment 1, children were considered to pass the Production task if they 
produced at least 2 out of 3 interpretations.  The Production and False Belief tasks did not 
differ in difficulty and both were easier then either the Reversal or Droodle tasks (McNemar, 
binomial, ps < 0.001).  The Reversal and Droodle tasks were of equal difficulty. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 are clear.  The Production task was again of similar difficulty to 
the False Belief task.  Both were easier than either the Droodle or Reversal task.  The Droodle 
and Reversal tasks were of similar difficulty, but not strongly related.  After partialling out 
age, the Reversal task did not correlate with any other task, including the Production task.  
The Production task however correlated with both the False Belief and Droodle task (although 
the correlation with False Belief remained only marginally significant when age was 
partialled out). 
The lack of correlation between the Reversal and Production tasks, although 
superficially surprising, is consistent with our argument: Reversal does not occur until 
children pass the False Belief and Production tasks, suggesting that these tasks mark a 
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prerequisite.  However, Reversal does not correlate with either of them, suggesting that the 
prerequisite is not required for reversal as such, but for a quite different process that will 
result in reversal. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We failed to find the remarkably strong correlation between the Reversal and Droodle tasks 
found by Gopnik & Rosati (2001).  The two tasks were of similar difficulty, but were only 
weakly related.  Our findings therefore do not support the idea that the ability to perceive 
reversal is based on an abstract and complex understanding of ambiguity.  
However, the understanding that there can be two interpretations of an ambiguous 
figure seems to arise about a year earlier than the ability to perceive reversal.  We designed 
the novel Production task to elicit this understanding.  As hypothesised, this task was of 
similar difficulty to the False Belief task, and performances on the two tasks were 
substantially and significantly correlated.  The correlations remained significant after age was 
partialled out, if only marginally so in Experiment 2, suggesting that despite the superficial 
differences in the tasks, both involve a common understanding.   
 There are potential counter-explanations for our findings.  The Production task of 
course requires the ability to recall the alternative interpretation of a figure.  Our assumption 
is that without the ability to conceive of their even being an alternative interpretation children 
will not even attempt to recall it.  False positives would therefore be unlikely.  The danger of 
false negatives is more serious: children might understand that there can be an alternative 
percept, but be unable to recall what it is.  Effective recall also involves the ability to suppress 
the currently perceived alternative, so executive function deficits might also account for poor 
performance.  
 We cannot discount these possibility on the basis of present evidence, but the close 
analogy between the Production task and the “say something different” tasks used in previous 
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research suggests that these potential executive function or memory deficits are not 
particularly problematic in this kind of task with this age group.  Understanding of 
homonymy, synonymy, and hierarchically related terms such as dog and animal, have all been 
assessed using production SSD tasks.  These tasks pose similar recall and executive 
difficulties to the ambiguous figures Production task.  For example, in the Synonym 
Production task, children are provided with one word, truck, and required to state its 
synonym, lorry.  This requires recall of lorry and suppression of truck.   
However, these tasks have also been administered in judgement versions.  Children 
are required to judge the production attempts of another.  In the synonym task, for example, a 
puppet might produce the same word as the child (incorrect), a misnomer, or a synonym 
(correct).  Children have to judge whether that was what Puppet should have said.   Recall and 
inhibition demands are therefore kept to a minimum, since both alternatives are provided 
almost simultaneously by the experimenter.  Despite posing different executive difficulties, 
the judgement and production versions of these SSD tasks are of equivalent difficulty, and 
both types of task substantially correlate with the false belief task (Doherty, 2000; Doherty & 
Perner, 1998; Perner et al., 2002).  Performance on our ambiguous figures Production task 
develops in a very similar way to performance on the other SSD tasks, and shows a similar 
association with false belief understanding.  It therefore seems reasonable to conclude it 
measures a similar competence, and therefore is unlikely to be substantially affected by poor 
recall or executive functioning. 
 Regardless of its cause, the present study nevertheless highlights a critical prerequisite 
for reversal.  Until the age of roughly four years, children cannot report both interpretations of 
an ambiguous figure.  At this age, they become able to do so; this development coincides with 
the ability to pass the false belief task, and is specifically associated with it.  What remains to 
be explained is why children do not experience reversal until roughly a year later. 
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The visual search hypothesis suggests that one simply needs to look at the appropriate 
part of the figure for it to reverse.  If children understand that there can be an alternative 
percept, they should be motivated to search for it.   It is not clear why search should be 
difficult, and it does not offer a ready role for development.  Rock et al.’s imagination 
hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that one has to impose a mental image of the 
alternative interpretation onto the stimulus in order to get it to reverse.  This plausibly requires 
a high degree of cognitive control, or executive function.  Children would have to suppress or 
inhibit the currently experienced interpretation.  There is considerable evidence that this kind 
of inhibitory ability is still developing in the preschool period (Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & 
Tidswell, 1991;  Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996; Carlson & 
Moses, 2001).   
Children would also need visual imagery abilities.  There is evidence that at least some 
of these abilities are also developing in the preschool period (Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, 
Goldknopf, & Daly, 1990).  There is also an implied link with the development of theory of 
mind abilities.  Estes (1998) gave children a task which adults solve using mental rotation.  
Children who performed well at the task described their behaviour in terms of mental activity; 
children who performed poorly did not.  The results showed 4-year-olds to be much poorer 
than 6-year-olds, who were closer to adult-like performance.  Estes suggests that increased 
awareness of one’s own mental states may allow more use of mental imagery.  Theory of 
mind abilities might therefore play more than one role in the ability to reverse. 
The hypothesised relationship between the ability to reverse and developing inhibition 
and mental imagery should be studied directly in future research.  The visual search 
hypothesis is also empirically testable through observing eye-movements.  Children’s fixation 
behaviour should change after they start to pass the Production task.  Furthermore, reversals 
should correspond to fixation of specific parts of the image.  Past research has addressed this 
latter issue, but has been unable to determine whether fixation changes caused reversal, or 
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reversal caused subjects to alter their fixation points (e.g. Ellis & Stark, 1978).  Advances in 
eye-tracking equipment might now allow the issue of cause and effect to be teased apart.  The 
issue of differing eye movement patterns after discovery of the ambiguity of the image has not 
yet been addressed, either with adults or children.  
CONCLUSION 
The present study advances our understanding of the phenomenon of reversal of ambiguous 
figures.  We found that the ability to acknowledge both interpretations of an ambiguous figure 
arises about the age of four years.  This is related to development of false belief 
understanding.  We also found, like Gopnik & Rosati (2001), that there was a lag of roughly 
one year between understanding false belief and experiencing reversal.  However, we found 
no specific relationship between reversal and complex understanding of ambiguity, indexed 
by the ability to pass the Droodle task.  This should not be surprising: previous theoretical 
analyses of the process of reversal suggest that understanding of the ambiguous nature of the 
stimuli may be necessary but is not sufficient to achieve reversal.  Some additional process is 
required – either through the use of mental imagery or in directing attention to other parts of 
the figure.  We argue that the lag is explained by the difficulty of this additional process.  The 
imagination hypothesis is most plausible, since it clearly requires high executive functioning 
and good mental imagery, both of which develop rapidly at around the age of four years.  
Both the imagination and visual search hypotheses allow clear empirical predictions, which 
can now be tested. 
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Footnote (p. 11) 
1 All correlations in this paper are Pearson’s r.  The point biserial and phi correlations, which 
are special cases of Pearson’s r, are used when one or both variables are dichotomous, 
respectively (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 1979).  
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Table 1.   
The percentage of children passing the tasks of Experiment 1.   
 
      Age groups 
______________________________________________________ 
 
    3;3  3;10  4;7  5;2  Overall 
 
  n =  18  19  19  17  73 
______________________________________________________ 
 
False belief  28  48  84  88  62 
 
Droodle  11  21  29  77  34 
 
Production  28  47  74  94  47 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note.  For the Production task, the pass criterion is at least 2 out of 3 trials correct. 
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Table 2.   
The percentage of children producing 0 to 3 pairs in the Production task of Experiment 1.   
 
      Age groups 
______________________________________________________ 
 
    3;3  3;10  4;7  5;2  Overall 
 
  n =  18  19  19  17  73 
______________________________________________________ 
 
Pairs produced 
 
0   44  16  5  0  16 
 
1   28  37  21  6  23 
 
2   11  32  0  12  14 
 
3   17  16  74  82  47 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3a.  
 Intercorrelations between age and the experimental tasks of Experiment 1. 
 
 
False  Droodle Production   
   Belief 
   __________________________________ 
 
Age   .50***  .46***  .62***   
 
False Belief  ---  .33**  .47***   
 
Droodle    ----  .41***   
____________________________________________________ 
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Table 3b.   
Age-partialled correlations between the experimental tasks of Experiment 1. 
 
   Droodle Production  
______________________ 
   
False Belief  .13  .24*    
 
Droodle  ----  .18   
________________________________________ 
* p< 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
Children’s understanding of ambiguous figure  28 
 
Table 4.   
The percentage of children passing the four tasks of Experiment 2.   
 
 
      Age groups 
__________________________________________ 
 
    3;10  4;8  5;4  Overall 
 
  n =  21  23  21  65 
__________________________________________ 
 
 
False belief  48  74  95  72 
 
Production  43  78  86  69 
 
Droodle  5  39  57  34 
 
Reversal  19  26  57  34 
___________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5a.   
Intercorrelations between age and the experimental tasks of Experiment 2. 
 
 
   False  Droodle Production Reversal  
   Belief 
   ___________________________________________ 
Age   .49***  .47***  .52***  .35** 
 
False Belief  ---  .30*  .43***  .30* 
 
Droodle    ----  .44***  .31* 
 
Production      ---  .09 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5b.  
 Age-partialled correlations between the experimental tasks of Experiment 2. 
 
   Droodle Production Reversal  
   _______________________________  
    
False Belief  .09  .24  .16  
 
Droodle  ----  .26*  .18 
 
Production    ---  -0.12 
_________________________________________________ 
* p< 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure legends: 
 
Figure 1a.  The duck-rabbit stimulus, alone and with disambiguating context pictures. 
 
Figure 1b.  The vase-faces stimulus, alone and with disambiguating context pictures. 
 
Figure 1c.  The man-mouse stimulus, alone and with disambiguating context pictures. 
 
Figure 1d.  The Eskimo-indian stimulus, alone and with disambiguating context pictures. 
 
 
